All Writ Petition (Civil)

Order - Status 6: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.5308 OF 2008 Rashmi Gruh Nirman Pvt.Ltd. through its Director Shri Ashwin Tribhuvandas Shah ...Petitioner Versus Unique Shanti Developers through its proprietor Harshad P.Doshi ...Respondent ...... Mrs.Neeta Karnik for Petitioner. Mr.Vineet B.Naik with Mr.Amit Yadkikar i/b M/s.Desai & Diwanji for Respondent. ...... CORAM: A.M.KHANWILKAR, J. AUGUST 7, 2008. P.C. Heard Counsel for the parties. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, by consent. Mr.Yadkikar waives notice for Respondent. As short question is involved, Petition is taken up for final disposal forthwith, by consent. This Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the Judgment and Order passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane dated 27th February 2008 below Exhibit 353 in Special Civil Suit No.362 of 2000. By this order, the Trial Court has rejected the Application preferred by the Petitioner for amendment of written statement. By the said Application, the Petitioner intended to insert Paragraph 20A in the written statement which reads thus: "20A. That the suit filed by Unique Shanti Developer is not maintainable as the plan which is shown to have been sanctioned in the name of unique Shanti Pvt Ltd and the said plan is also sanctioned much after alleged suit agreement and hence the said suit agreement are not binding. Moreover by virtue of provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Repeal Act 1999, the provisions of Urban Ceiling Act are not applicable to suit lands, this has been done by State of Maharashtra by its government gazette dated 6.12.2007 wherein it has been declared that "Now, therefore in pursuance of clause (2) of article 252 of the Constitution of India, the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly hereby resolves that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Repeal Act 1999, passed by the parliament be adopted for this state." The Trial Court, however, has rejected the said application essentially on two counts. Firstly, that admission given in the cross-examination cannot be termed as subsequent event to permit bringing on record new facts now pleaded in the proposed amendment. The second reason is that the issuance of Notification referred to in the latter part of Paragraph 20A cannot be the basis to permit amendment to the written statement. Insofar as the first reason is concerned, I am in agreement with the submission of the Petitioner that it is for the first time during the course of cross-examination, the Respondent produced sanctioned plan on 16th October 2007. No reference to the said sanctioned plan was made in the Plaint or produced along with the documents on any earlier occasion. The position now stated in proposed Paragraph 20A is with reference to the said sanctioned plan which has come on record for the first time on 16th October 2007. That indeed was a revelation made to the Petitioner for the first time during the course of trial. Therefore, the Petitioner was entitled to raise such issues as were available to the Petitioner in relation to the said fact. That is the purport of amendment to be introduced in the written statement in terms of Paragraph 20A. By that amendment, the Petitioner would contend that the Suit filed by the Respondent itself is not maintainable as plan was sanctioned in favour of person other than the Respondent/Plaintiff. That fact necessarily has to be pleaded and also proved by the Defendant for which amendment as sought will have to be granted in the interest of justice. Insofar as the opinion recorded by the Trial Court in the context of the latter part of the Paragraph 20A, I am in agreement with the Petitioner that the merits of the efficacy of the Notification dated 1st December 2007 will have to be decided at the trial. The fact remains that the Notification has been issued recently on 1st December 2007. That is a subsequent event which is pleaded in proposed Paragraph 20A. Thus understood, even that part of the amendment will have to be granted. In the circumstances, the impugned Judgment and Order is set-aside and instead Application Exhibit 353 filed by the Petitioner is made absolute with further direction that the Petitioner shall carry out amendment within three weeks from today. The Petitioner who is personally present in Court, through Counsel, assures that the Petitioner will extend full co-operation to the Trial Court for early disposal of the Suit and shall not take recourse to any further applications during the course of trial to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. That assurance is accepted. Needless to observe that as the Petitioner is permitted to amend the written statement by inserting Paragraph 20A and the written statement has been treated as counter claim, the Respondent would be free to file such pleadings in response to the said amended written statement as may be advised. That be done within two weeks from the date the Petitioner carries out amendment in the written statement. Petition disposed of on the above terms. No order as to costs. A.M.KHANWILKAR, J.

Order - Status 9: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.6065 OF 2014 Bhalchandra Mohiniraj Pathak and anr. .. Petitioners Versus Madhyam Varigye Sarvodaya Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit through Chairman and ors. .. Respondents Mr. S. S. Patwardhan, advocate for petitioner. Mr. Bhadrashetti with S. D. Chawan i/by Rahul Sopanrao Kate for respondent. --- CORAM : SMT. R. P. SONDURBALDOTA DATED : 24th JULY, 2014. --- P.C. : 1). Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of the learned advocates, the petition is taken on board for final hearing. 2). The short question that arises for consideration in this petition is whether the correspondence between the Chief Promoter of Society, Madhyam Vargye Sarvodaya Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit, Pune and the Additional Secretary to Government of Maharashtra, Housing Development and Special Assistance Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai, annexed to the order of exemption under Section 19(1)(v) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and regulation) Act, 1976, can be said to be public document. 3). There is a dispute pending in the Cooperative Court between the petitioner and the respondents in which one of the disputed facts is the total strength of membership of respondent no.1, Society. According to the respondents, the membership is restricted to 11 persons and the petitioners, on the other hand contend that, there are as many as 141 members of the Society. During the course of the trial, the petitioners sought to produce photocopies of the letter dated 30th August, 1989 from the Additional Secretary to Government of Maharashtra, Housing Development and Special Assistance Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai to one Shri G. H. Kulkarni, Chief Promoter of respondent no.1, Society and the reply sent by Mr. Kulkarni to the letter alongwith annexures to the letter, in evidence in support of their claim of the membership of the Society by 141 persons. The production of the photocopies as secondary evidence was objected to by the respondents. The objection was upheld by the trial Court and also the lower appellate Court. It was held by the Courts below that, the petitioners have not established the circumstances prescribed for production of secondary evidence and also that the photocopies cannot be said to be secondary evidence. The petitioners had carried the order to this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 6350 of 2011. By the order dated 23rd August, 2012, this court dismissed the petition without going into its merits, with an observation that, since the orders under challenge in the petition were interlocutory in nature, interest of the justice would be served if the writ petition was disposed off with a clarification that in the event the final order in the dispute is adverse to the petitioners, they can, while challenging the final order, raise appropriate pleas and in particular in regard to the rejection by the trial court and the lower appellate court of leave to lead secondary evidence. The petitioners then carried the orders further to the Apex Court. However, the Apex Court also did not interfere with the order of this court. 4). It appears that thereafter one out of 141 members, died and his son, found certified copies of the two documents described above in the papers maintained by the deceased member. The certified copies have been obtained from the Tahashil Office, Pune, where apparently the same were produced in connection with the land dealing. The petitioners, then filed another application for tendering in evidence, the certified copies as the secondary evidence. The trial Court, allowed the application by its order dated 12th March, 2014. Being aggrieved by the order, the respondents had preferred revision to the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court, Mumbai Bench at Pune. The Appellate Court allowed the revision by its order dated 19th April, 2014 which order is challenged by the petitioners in the present petition. 5). The reasons set out in the impugned order by the Appellate Court, for allowing the revision, read as follows :- "29. After perusal of documents, which the respondent no.1 and 2 produce on record at Sr. no.1 to 3, it is evidence that, 'these documents are the annexure attached with the order issued by the public officer'. Even though presuming for the sake of argument that, these documents were attached with the order passed by the public officer, such documents cannot be terms as public documents, the provisions of Section 74 and 76 of Evidence Act doesn't apply in the present set of facts. At the most, said document is termed as the part and parcel of the record maintained by the public officer. Thus, doesn't cover within the meaning of the term public document. After perusing these documents, it is also evident that, the certified copies allegedly availed from the Tahasil Office, Pune whereas as per pleadings of the respondent no.1 & 2, the record is maintained by the Housing Development and Special Assistance Department, Mumbai. It was also responsibility of applicant to explain the proper custody, which the applicants, failed. Thus, on merits also this application deserves to be dismissed. So far as the fourth document is concerned, admittedly same is part and parcel of court record, which can be directly referred. So also it is not explained as to why the fourth document needs to be brought on record, and it is not related to subject matter of dispute." 6). Mr. Bhadrashetti, the learned advocate for the respondent, in seeking to justify the impugned order, submits that the documents in question are essentially correspondence by a private individual with the government department. Therefore, the same cannot fall within the domain of public document as defined in Section 74 of The Indian Evidence Act. His second objection is that, certification of the documents ought to be by the same department that received the document and not by any other department of the Government. The third argument advanced by him is, of the bar by the principle analogous to res-judicata to the second application for production of secondary evidence by the petitioner, the first application having already been decided in the earlier round of proceedings mentioned above. The order in respect thereof has reached finality with the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Apex Court. He submits that, the observation by the Co-operative Tribunal, that application is filed solely for the purpose of delaying the trial is justified and he presses for dismissal of the petition. 7). The respondent cannot be allowed to contend that, the second application by the petitioner was barred by, res-judicata, as both the Courts below have negatived the contention and there is no challenge to the finding. The Co-operative Appellate Tribunal at para-23 of the impugned order, has held that the earlier application had been moved under Section 75(a)(b) of The Indian Evidence Act, whereas, the second application is moved under Section 75(e) of The Indian Evidence Act. The two applications being different applications, there was no applicability of principle analogous to res-judicata. 8). The question, therefore, to be considered now is, can the certified copies issued by one department of the Government i.e. Tahasil Office, Pune in respect of the order issued by another office of the Government i.e. Housing Development and Special Assistance Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai alongwith its' annexures, be said to be the public document for the purpose of production in the Court of law. The description of the three documents in question, annexed to the order of exemption, is as follows :- "(a). Letter dated 30/8/1989 issued by Shri. S.V. Yadgikar (Additional Secretary) to Late G.H. Kulkarni. (b). Letter dated 29/9/1989 issued by late G.H. Kulkarni to Housing Development Department. (c). List of Members of Madhaymvargiya Sahakari Griharachna Sanstha Mydt. sent by Late G.H. Kulkarni alongwith his letter dated 29/9/1989." Section 74 of The Indian Evidence Act, which defines the term "public document" reads as under :- "74. Public documents.- The following documents are public documents:- (1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts- (i) of the sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, [of any part of India or of the Commonwealth], or of a foreign country; (2) public records kept [in any State] of private documents." 9). It appears that the Society had earlier filed application under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 seeking exemption under Section 19(1)(v). The three documents sought to be now produced, relate to the application for exemption. It is the correspondence consisting of a letter received from Housing Development and Special Assistance Department, Mantralaya and reply sent by Chief Promoter, Society to the said Department alongwith the annexure to the letter. The correspondence, therefore, is with a public officer in connection with his office duties. This correspondence is maintained as record for the purpose of grant of exemption under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. This record forms the basis of grant of exemption. As such, it will have to be treated as part of the documents forming records of the acts of public officer. Further, as noted by the Appellate Court, the three documents are annexures to the order passed by the public officer. Once a certified copy of order of a public officer passed in connection with his public duty is produced, it cannot be severed from its annexures because the document, then would become incomplete. Therefore, the annexures to the order will also have to be held admissible in evidence only to the extent of their existence. The truth of the contents of the documents needs to be separately established. Mr. Patwardhan, the learned Advocate for the petitioner does not dispute this position. 10). As regards the certification of the documents by the department different from the department with whom the correspondence had taken place, in my view the same should not create any difficulty. The document had apparently been produced before the office of Tahashil, Pune in connection with the very land and the document filed with the Tahashil Office has been certified by that office and given to the petitioner. Therefore, custody of the document has been established for the purpose of issuing certified copies. In any case, this aspect is always subject to cross examination. The petition is hence allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). 11). At the request of the advocate for the respondent, the order is stayed for a period of four weeks. He makes the statement that the respondent shall not proceed with the trial in the dispute pending before the Cooperative Court during the period of four weeks. (SMT. R. P. SONDURBALDOTA, J)

Order - Status 7: ttm IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.6006 OF 2011 The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nasik .. Petitioner Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. .. Respondents Mr.Mahesh Agawekar i/b Ms.Anamik Malhotra for the petitioner Mr.P.G.Sawant 'B' Panel for respondent no.1 Mr.J.D.Khairnar for respondent no.2 CORAM: K.K. TATED, J. DATE: 1st AUGUST, 2011 PC: Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, matter is taken for final hearing and disposed of at the stage of admission itself. By this petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner original respondent challenges the order dt. 6.5.2011 passed by learned Member, Industrial Court, Nasik, below Ex.U2 filed by respondent no.2 for interim relief to stay the operation and implementation of transfer order dt. 16.12.2010 issued by the petitioner, Zilla Parishad, Nasik. Respondent no.2 is working with the petitioner, Zilla Parishad, Nasik as Desk Officer. Initially, on account of misconduct he was suspended by order dt.1.9.2010. Thereafter, respondent no.2 made representation to the petitioner. Considering respondent no.2's representation, petitioner issued the order dt. 15.12.2010 reinstating respondent no.2 in his original post subject to departmental enquiry. Thereafter, on the next date, petitioner issued transfer order dt.16.12.2010 transferring respondent no.2 on said post to Panchayat Samiti, Surgana. Respondent no.2 joined their as Desk Officer and worked for 4/5 months. Thereafter, respondent no.2 filed a complaint (ULP) No.108 of 2011 before the Industrial Court under Items 3 and 9 of Schedule IV of MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 along with application for interim relief under section 30(2). In the said complaint, respondent no.2 contended that he is suffering 40% disability and same is declared by the Medical Board as per certificate dt.3.3.2005. Thereafter, on the basis of Government Resolution dt.15.04.2004 and 15.12.2004, he is entitled to be posted near his home town i.e. at Nasik. The said interim application was allowed by leaned Member, Industrial Court by impugned order dt.6.5.2011 and directed petitioner, Zilla Parishad, Nasik to allow respondent no.2 to work at Nasik or near Nasik as per Government Resolution No.15.04.2004 and 15.12.2004. Hence, the present petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Member of Industrial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that respondent no.2 by way of interim relief is entitled to stay the operation and implementation of the transfer order dt. 16.12.2010. He further submits that initially respondent no.2 was suspended on 1.9.2010 and thereafter, considering his applications, they reinstated him on his original post by order dt.15.12.2010 subject to departmental enquiry. He further submits that departmental enquiry is going on against respondent no.2. He further submits that initially respondent no.2 joined the services as per transfer order dt.16.12.2010 at Panchayat Samiti, Surgana without complaining about his disability and thereafter, filed complaint (ULP) No.108 of 2011. He submits that the main complaint is pending for hearing and final disposal. The Industrial Court by interim relief allowed indirectly prayer in the main complaint itself. Therefore, impugned order passed by learned Member, Industrial Court, Nasik, dt.6.5.11 is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent no.2 vehemently opposed the present petition. He submits that as per Government Resolution dt.15.04.2004 and 15.12.2004 respondent no.2 is entitled to the posting near his home town. He submits that respondent no.2 has his house at Nasik. Since beginning he has stayed there. He submits that the Village Surgana is about 50 to 60 kms from Nasik and therefore, it is very difficult for him to attend his duty there. He submits that after joining at Surgana he noticed that due to 40% disability he is facing several difficulties and therefore, he preferred the present complaint. I have gone through the G.R. dt.15.4.04 and 15.12.04. I have also gone through the reinstatement letter dt.15.12.2010 and transfer order dt.16.12.2010. It is to be noted that initially respondent no.2 was suspended in the year 2010. On his request, petitioner reinstated him on 15.10.10 subject to departmental enquiry. Not only that his main complaint challenging the transfer order dt.15.12.2010 is pending. By interim relief learned Member, Industrial Court, Nasik indirectly allowed the respondent no.2's main complaint itself. Considering all these facts, I am of the opinion that the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nasik erred in staying operation and implementation of the Tribunal's order dt.16.12.2010 directing petitioner Zilla Parishad, Nasik to allow respondent no.2 to work at Nasik or near Nasik as per G.R. dt.15.4.2010 and 15.12.2010. The learned counsel for the petitioner makes a statement that at present, no post is available at Nasik or near Nasik. Considering these facts, the impugned order passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nasik below Exh.U2 in complaint ULP 108 o 2010 is set aside. 10.Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, hearing of complaint (ULP) No. 108 of 2011 is expedited. 11.Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. (K.K.TATED,J.)

Order - Status 5: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE WRIT PETITION NO.4796 OF 2010 Shamrao Mahadev Phate : Petitioner V/s. The Collector & District Election Officer, Solapur & Ors. : Respondents .... Mr.S.S.Salunkhe for the petitioner. Mr.S.N.Patil, Asstt. Govt. Pleader for respondent nos.1 & 2. .... CORAM : D.D. SINHA AND MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR,JJ. DATE : JUNE 23, 2010. P.C.: Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner orally seeks permission to implead Solapur District Central Co-operative Bank as a partyrespondent. Leave granted. Appropriate amendment in the cause title be carried out forthwith. Notice before admission, returnable on 12.7.2010. Mr.Patil, the learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader, waives service for the respondent nos.1 & 2. (D.D. SINHA, J.) (MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR,J.)

Order - Status 7: FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET NO . IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE WRIT PETITION NO.4796 OF 2010 Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, appearances, Court's orders or directions and Registrar's orders. Court's or Judge's orders Mr.S.S.Salunkhe for the petitioner. Mr.S.N.Patil, AGP for resp. nos.1 & 2. Mr.Sarag Aryadha for respondent no.3. Mr.S.S.Inamdar for respondent no.4. CORAM : D.D. SINHA AND MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, JJ. DATE : JULY 09, 2010. P.C.: Considering the cause of action involved, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks liberty to mention the matter before the appropriate Court. Permission granted. (D.D. SINHA, J.) (MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR,J.)

Order - Status 11: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 WRIT PETITION NO.4796 OF 2010 Petitioner Respondents Mr.S.S.Rajeshirke for petitioner. Mr.S.N.Bhosale, AGP for respondent nos.1 and 2. Mr.Sarang Aradhye for respondent no.3. Mr.Inamdar for respondent no.4. CORAM : R.V.MORE, J. DATE : 12th July 2010 PC : Not on on board. In view of urgency, the production is allowed and matter is taken on board. Heard Mr.Rajeshirke for the petitioner, Mr.Aradhye for respondent no.3, Mr.Inamdar for respondent no.4 and Mr.Bhosale, learned AGP for respondent nos.1 and 2. The petition pertains to the election of respondent no.4 The Solapur District Central Co-operative Bank Limited, Solapur (hereinafter referred to as "the said bank"). The Gardi Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd; Gardi (hereinafter referred to as "the Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd.") is the member of respondent no.4. The said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd. passed a resolution on 20th March 2010 thereby nominating the respondent no.3 as it's delegate to take part in the general election of respondent no.4 bank. The resolution was sent to the respondent no.4 bank by the said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd. and respondent no.3's name was shown in provisional voters list as a delegate of said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd.. The petitioner contends that a resolution came to be passed by the said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd. on 24th March 2010 thereby nominating him as a delegate of the said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd.. In spite of this resolution, his name is not entered into the provisional voters list. An objection was raised before the Collector, however, the same was rejected only on the ground that the signature of the Secretary of the said Society does not appear on the resolution. By order dated 18th March 2010, the learned Collector rejected the petitioner's petitioner for non inclusion of his name in the provisional voters list as a delegate of the said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd.. The final voters list thereafter was published in the month of May 2010 and against the name of said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd; the name of respondent no.3 is shown as it's delegate. Rule 16 programme was subsequently published on 3rd July 2010 and the last date for filing the nomination is today. The election is at an advanced stage. The petitioner, in spite of rejection of objection by the Collector on 18th May 2010, filed present petition on 18th June 2010 i.e. after nearly about one month. The petitioner is guilty of laches. Apart from these facts, admittedly there are two resolutions passed by the said Vividh Karyakari Society Ltd; one in favour of respondent no.3 and another in favour of the petitioner. The respondent no.4 bank acted upon the resolution of the said Society wherein respondent no.3 was nominated as a delegate. The relevant question would be, which, out of the two resolutions, is the valid resolution. The validity of said two resolutions can be gone into by the Co-operative Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge the validity of the said resolution along with the out-come of the election. Taking totality of the circumstances into consideration, I am of the opinion that the petition is devoid of any substance and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. (R.V.MORE, J.)

Order - Status 5: FARAD CONTINUATION SHEET IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE SIDE CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 2 OF 2014 Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Court's or Judge's Orders Coram, appearances, Court's Orders or directions and Registrar's Orders Mr. Machindra Bodke, advocate for the Petitioner. Ms. V.S. Mhaispurkar, APP for State. CORAM :SMT.SADHANA S. JADHAV , J DATE :JANUARY 15, 2014 P.C.: 1 Learned APP waives service for respondent and seeks time. Issue notice to respondent No. 2. Notice returnable on 12/2/2014. 2 Pendency of this Petition shall not be construed as stay to the proceedings. ( SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV , J) Talwalkar 1/1

Order - Status 7: Anand IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2 OF 2014 Jayesh B. Kanoga .Petitioner V/s. The State of Maharashtra & anr. .Respondents Mr.A.M.Moorthy, Advocate, for the Petitioner Mr.Rajesh More, APP, for the Respondent No.1 – State Mr.Rahul Arote, Advocate, for the Respondent No.2 CORAM : REVATI MOHITE DERE, J. DATE : 20TH JUNE, 2014 P.C. . Mr.Arote states that he has been instructed to appear on behalf of the respondent No.2. The office objection, therefore, does not survive. The matter to be listed under the caption "For Admission" after notice on 04.07.2014. (REVATI MOHITE DERE, J.)

Order - Status 10: spb/ 10wp2-14.sxw CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 02 OF 2014 Jayesh B. Kanoga … Petitioner. V/s. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. … Respondents. Mr. A. M. Moorthy, Advocate, for the Petitioner. Mr. S. Pasbola with Rahul Arote, Advocate, for the Respondent No.2. Mr. V.B.KondeDeshmukh, APP for the State. CORAM : M.L.TAHALIYANI,J. DATE : 02 SEPTEMEBR, 2014 P.C. : 1 Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2 The Petitioner is facing trial for the offences punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The trial is concluded and it is kept for recording of the statement of the Petitioner under section 313 of the Cr. P.C.. 3 The Petitioner had made an application for sending the cheque to the document examiner to determine the hand writing on the cheque. The Petitioner denies of his hand writing on the cheque. He admits his signature on the cheque. The learned Advocate Mr.Pasbola, appearing on behalf of the Borey 1/2 Respondent No.2, has stated that it is not the case of the Respondent No.2 that the cheque was in the hand writing of the Petitioner. The case of the Respondent No.2 is that the cheque bears the signature of the Petitioner and it was given by the Petitioner to Respondent No.2. 4 In view of the statement of the learned counsel for the Respondent No.2, it is not necessary to discuss the order of the learned Magistrate in detail. The position is made absolutely clear by the statement of the learned counsel for the Respondent No.2. In view thereof, I pass the following order. 5 The Writ Petition stands dismissed. Adinterim order, if any stands vacated. ….. (JUDGE)

Order - Status 5: suresh 908-WP-2265.2014 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE – CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2265 OF 2014 Sakshi Naresh Nagwani @ Neetu Kanayalal Gursahani .... Petitioner Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. .... Respondents Mr. J.S. Kini i/b Mr. Suresh Dubey for the Petitioner. Ms M.H. Mhatre, APP, for Respondent Nos.1 to 3. CORAM: V.M. KANADE & P.D. KODE, JJ. DATED: JULY 01, 2014 P.C: Issue notice before admission to the respondents, returnable on 3072014. The learned APP waives service of notice on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 3. In the meantime, there shall be adinterim relief in terms of prayer clause (b). (P.D. KODE, J.) (V.M. KANADE, J.)

Order - Status 9: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 2265 OF 2014 Sakshi N. Nagwani ..Petitioner v/s. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..Respondents Mr. Suresh Dubey for the Petitioner. Mr. Sunedh Kale a/w. Ms. K.H.Rajani for the respondent no.3. Mr. K.V.Saste, APP for the Respondent/State. CORAM : RANJIT MORE & SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI,JJ. DATED : JANUARY 12, 2015. P.C. This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the MECR No.3 of 2013 registered at Rabale Police Station, in pursuance of the order under Sec.156(3) issued by the learned Magistrate in OA No.256 of 2013. The petitioner is the wife of the respondent no.3, due to the differences between the parties, respondent no.3 has filed criminal case against the petitioner for offence punishable under Section 420, 384, 406, 504, 506, 407 r/w. 34 of IPC and under Section 67A of the Information Technology Act. The learned Judge passed an order under Section 156(3) and thereafter MECR in question is registered against the petitioner. The differences and disputes between the parties were thereafter settled by intervention of mediator and accordingly consent terms were entered into between the parties in Criminal Application No. 743 of 2014. In para 14 and para 22 of the said consent terms both the parties agreed to withdraw the allegations made against each other. The respondent no.3 has also given no objection for quashing of the said MECR. The respondent no.3 also has filed an affidavit dated 12.1.2015. In para 3 he has given no objection for quashing and setting aside the said MECR in pursuance of the consent terms dated 23.12.2014. The respondent no.3 is personally present in the court. He states that he has gone through the consent terms and affidavit and states that he has no objection for quashing the said MECR. He further states that he is giving no objection without any influence or coercion from anybody. In the above facts and circumstances, and in the light of the decision in the case of in B. S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana reported [AIR 2003 SC 1386] wherein it is held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.". It can, thus, be seen that the matter has been amicably settled between the parties. From the perusal of complaint, it transpires that the allegations are totally personal in nature. There is no element of public law involved in the crime. In these circumstances, and especially, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab, [(2008) 4 SCC 582] , we find that no purpose would be served by keeping the criminal proceedings pending except burdening the Criminal Courts which are already overburdened. In the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision as well as in the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab [2014 AIR SCW 2065] we are of the considered view that there is no impediment in quashing the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). (ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.) (RANJIT MORE, J.)

Order - Status 11: SSK IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 2265 OF 2014 Sakshi Naresh Nagwani ….Petitioner versus State of Maharashtra and ors. ….Respondents None for the petitioner. Ms. K. H. Rajani, advocate for respondent No.4. CORAM : RANJIT MORE & ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, JJ. DATED : 5th MARCH, 2015. P.C.: The matter is placed on board for speaking to the minutes of order dated 12th January, 2015. It is submitted that certain inadvertent mistakes have crept in the said order. The said mistakes are rectified and are, accordingly, read and substituted as under : In paragraph 1, instead of "OA No.256 of 2013", it be read and substituted as "OMA No.658 of 2013". In paragraph 2, line 4, "Section 407" be read and substituted "Section 497". In cause-title as well as in paragraphs 2 and 4, the words "respondent No.3", be read and substituted as "respondent No.4". The order dated 12th January, 2015, stands corrected accordingly. (ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.) (RANJIT MORE, J.) Shubhada S Kadam 1/1

Order - Status 7: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 5664 OF 2010 Dhondiram Shankar Masal & Anr. .. Petitioners V/s Nana Narayan Masal & Ors. .. Respondents Mr. R.V. Bansode for the petitioners. Mr. Surel S. Shah for respondent no.1. CORAM : D.G. KARNIK, J. DATE : 9TH AUGUST 2010 P.C. : Heard. By this petition, the petitioners challenge the common order dated 28 April 2010 passed by the learned District Judge1, Pandharpur, rejecting the petitioners' applications at Exhibits 94, 101, 102 and 118. By that order, the application made by the respondent no.1 at Exhibit 106 was also rejected. Respondent no. 1, however, has not challenged the order rejecting his application at Exhibit 106. Respondent no.1 in the writ petition is the original plaintiff. The petitioners and respondent nos.2 to 7 are the original defendants. In a suit for partition filed by respondent no.1 a decree for partition and separate possession was passed. The petitioners filed an appeal in which a partial stay to the execution was granted by the appellate court. The appellate court directed that the execution of the decree upto the delivery of possession can proceed but only directed stay for delivery of possession till the disposal of the appeal. Thereafter the petitioners filed an execution proceeding and the decree appears to have been sent to the Collector for partition. It appears that thereafter the Tahsildar issued a notice for possession but actual possession was not delivered when it was brought to the notice of the Tahsildar that there was a stay for delivery of possession. Thereafter the present petitioners made various applications mentioned above. By the application at Exhibit 57, the petitioners prayed that the proceedings for contempt of court be initiated against the Tahsildar. By the application at Exhibit 94, the petitioners prayed that tamperings were made by the respondent no.1 in the proceedings of Regular Darkhast No. 9 of 2002 and, therefore, prosecution be launched under sections 466, 468, 120B and 34 of the I.P.C. The appellate court has held that there was no iota of evidence about the alleged tampering by the respondent no.1 No material was pointed out before me to show any tampering by the respondent no.1. Hence, that order requires no interference. By the application Exhibit 101, the petitioners prayed that notice be issued to Mr. Ajay Pawar, the Tahsildar. By the application Exhibit 118, the petitioners prayed that Tahsildar Mr. Pawar be joined as party to the appeal. By the common order, both the applications have been rejected. Application at Exhibit 102 was for expeditious hearing of the appeal. In the final order, the appeal is directed to be fixed for final hearing. Hence, there can be no grievance about it. The gravamen of the applications of the petitioners at Exhibits 101 and 118 appears to be that though a stay for delivery of possession was granted by the first appellate court, The Tahsildar issued the notice for possession and thereby committed the contempt. Admittedly, the lower appellate court had not stayed the total execution of the decree. It had granted permission to the parties to proceed with the execution of the decree for partition and it only put a condition that the possession shall not be delivered. The proceedings were then sent to the Collector for effecting the partition. It appears that papers were sent by the Collector to the Tahsildar for partition. It appears that the Tahsildar did not notice that there was stay for delivery of possession and issued only the notice for possession. However, he did not deliver the possession on the fact of stay being brought to his notice. Thus, no breach of the order of the stay passed by the appellate court was committed. Hence, the decision of the trial court refusing to take action against the Tahsildar and joining him as a party appears to be proper requiring no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It may be noted that the suit was iled in the year 1996 and the appeal was filed in the year 2002. Thus, for 14 long years the respondent no.1, who has obtained the decree for possession, has been kept out of possession of the property. The present writ petition appears to be nothing but an attempt to further delay the hearing of the appeal and thereby stall the delivery of possession. For these reasons, there is no merit in the writ petition which is hereby rejected summarily. The lower appellate court is directed to decide the appeal expeditiously and, in any event, within 6 months hereof. (D.G. KARNIK, J.)

Order - Status 5: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.7 OF 2020 Shamim Makhmood Khan … Petitioner Vs. Shri Dr. K. Venkateshan & Ors. … Respondents ------- Mrs. Misbaah Solkar a/w Mr. Amin Solkar, advocates for the petitioner. Mrs. M.M. Deshmukh, APP for the respondents-State. CORAM : S.S. SHINDE & N.B. SURYAWANSHI, JJ. DATE : 13th JANUARY, 2020 P.C. : Heard. Issue notice for final disposal, returnable on 10/02/2020. Learned APP waives service of notice on behalf of the respondents and assures this court that original record pertaining to the detention of the detenu maintained by the respondents will be made available on the next date of hearing. (N.B. SURYAWANSHI, J.) (S.S. SHINDE, J.) Mugdha 1 of 1

Order - Status 7: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 7 OF 2020 Shamim Makhmood Khan ...Petitioner Versus Shri Dr.K.Venkateshan & Ors. ...Respondents …… Ms.Misbaah Solkar i/b. Mr.Amin Solkar for the Petitioner. Mrs. M.M.Deshmukh, APP for the Respondent-State. CORAM : S.S. SHINDE & V.G.BISHT, JJ. …… DATE : FEBRUARY 10, 2020 P.C.: The learned APP has tendered across the bar a copy of affidavit of Deputy Secretary (In-charge), Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special), Mantralaya, Mumbai. The same is taken on record. At the request of learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, stand over to 11th February, 2020. (V.G.BISHT, J.) (S.S. SHINDE, J.)

Order - Status 9: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 7 OF 2020 Shamim Makhmood Khan ...Petitioner Versus Dr. K. Venkateshan and Ors. ...Respondents *** Ms. Misbah Solkar i/by Mr. Amin Solkar for Petitioner. Mrs. M.M. Deshmukh, APP for Respondent – State. *** CORAM : S. S. SHINDE & V. G. BISHT, JJ. DATE : 11th FEBRUARY, 2020 PER COURT : Heard learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner for sometime. At her request, stand over to 12th February, 2020. (V.G. BISHT, J.) (S. S. SHINDE, J.)

Order - Status 11: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.7 OF 2020 Shamim Makhmood Khan ...Petitioner vs. Dr.K. Venkateshan & Ors. ...Respondents Ms.Misbah Solkar i/b Mohd. Amin H. Solkar for the Petitioner. Mrs.M.M. Deshmukh APP for Respondent-State. …… CORAM : S.S. SHINDE & V.G.BISHT, JJ. DATE : FEBRUARY 12, 2020 P.C.: Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APP for the State. Reserved for judgment for pronouncement of judgment on 21st February, 2020. (V.G.BISHT, J.) (S.S. SHINDE, J.)

Order - Status 15: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 07 OF 2020 Shamim Makmood Khan Age : 65 years, Occ : Business Resident of A.D. Camp Chowk, 1140, In front of Aaina Majjid, Bhavani Peth, Pune ] ] ] ] ]PETITIONER VERSUS 1. Shri. Dr. K. Venkateshan Commissioner of Police Pune City. ] ] ] 2. The State of Maharashtra ] ] ] 3. The Superintendent of Jail Yerwada Central Prison, Pune ] ] ] ] 4. The Secretary, Advisory Board (MPDA), Mantralaya, Mumbai ] ] ]RESPONDENTS Ms. Misbaah Solkar i/by Mr. Amin Solkar for the Petitioner. Mrs. M.M. Deshmukh, APP for Respondent/State. CORAM : S. S. SHINDE & V. G. BISHT, JJ. Reserved on : 12th FEBRUARY 2020 Pronounced on : 21st FEBRUARY 2020 JUDGMENT :- (PER S. S. SHINDE, J) 1 Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2 The Petitioner Shamim Makmood Khan, who is the mother of Detenu Firoj @ Babbali Maqbul Khan, has preferred this Petition questioning the preventive detention order passed against the dentenu on 16th October, 2019 by Respondent No. 1 – Commissioner of Police, Pune City. The said detention order has been passed under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug offenders, Dangerous persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'MPDA Act'). The said detention order has been issued as, according to the Detaining Authority, the Detenu is a Dangerous person whose activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detention order is based on two Crimes i.e. C.R. No. 188/2019 occurred on 09.06.2019 registered with Samarth Police Sation, Pune for the offences punishable under Sections 392, 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 37(1) read with 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act read with 4/25 of the Arms Act read with Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act; and another incident i.e. C.R. No. 208/2019 occurred on 11.07.2019 registered with Samarth Police Station, Pune for the offences punishable under Sections 394, 324, 506(2), 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and two in-camera statements of witnesses 'A' and 'B', recorded. 3 Though number of grounds have been raised in the present Petition whereby the detention order has been assailed, however, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner / Detenu has pressed only five grounds before us i.e. Ground Nos. 'A', 'B', 'C', 'F', and 'O'. Those grounds are reproduced herein below in verbatim:- A. The Petitioner says and submits that the orders annexed and marked at Exhibits "A" and "B" are manifestly erroneous and patently illegal in as much as the same are based in total defiance to the facts of the case, and the said orders also display a complete non-application of mind and is malafide on the part of the Detaining Authority. B. The Petitioner says and submits that by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order entailing his detention under the provisions of the said Act. None of the activities of the detenu, as mentioned in the grounds of detention, can be said to be disturbing the maintenance of public order and as such the orders are obviously illegal, bad in law, malafide, unconstitutional and unsustainable. C. The Petitioner says and submits that it is obligatory on the part of the Respondent No. 1 under Section 3 (3) of the said Act to send a REPORT forthwith in respect of the detention, together with the grounds of detention and other particulars to Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 1 is called upon to furnish details of the exact date on which the proposal and the findings and also the copies of the documents relied upon were placed before him and also the exact date on which he submitted the said report under Section 3(3) to Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2 is called upon to furnish the details of the exact date on which the said report was actually received by it. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are called upon to state as to what were the documents accompanying the said report and are further called upon to state whether the grounds of detention, as formulated by Respondent No. 1 and the material on which the grounds are based as well as other documents, if any, including the proposal and the findings were forwarded to Respondent No. 2 together with the said report. The Respondent No. 2 is called upon to furnish all details about the consideration, if any, of the said report including the date of which such consideration, if any, and the exact date of the approval of the detention order and the exact date of issuance of the order of approval. The Respondent No. 2 is called upon to state whether the approval, if any, was by a person competent and duly authorized under the relevant Rules of Business and/or the Standing Orders issued thereunder, to exercise the power of the State Government under section 3(3) of the said Act. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are called upon to furnish the above information to this Hon'ble Court based on the authentic contemporaneous official records and by due production thereof, before this Hon'ble Court since the documents relied upon by Respondent No. 1 in formulating the grounds of detention were not sent along with the order of detention for approval and if at all sent it was only after the order of detention was allegedly passed. If any of the provisions of the Section 3(3) of the said Act are not strictly observed or complied with, the detention and/or continued detention is illegal, unsustainable, unconstitutional, null and void. F. The Respondent No. 1 is bound to produce for the scrutiny of this Hon'ble Court the proposal and the findings for the detenu's detention, relied upon by Respondent No. 1 in formulating the grounds of detention. If the grounds of detention are no more than a repetition of the proposal with minor grammatical and consequential variations, there cannot be a greater proof of non-application of mind. It is well settled that the liberty of a Subject is a serious matter and the same cannot be trifled with any such casual, indifferent and routine manner. The Respondent No. 1 is called upon to state whether before formulating the grounds of detention, he did go through the opinion of different subordinate officers, if any, written on the said proposal. The Respondent No. 1 having gone through the opinion of his subordinate Officers and having been influenced by them in formulating the grounds of detention and in the passing of the detention order, then the said detention order suffers from non-application of mind and is illegal, malafide, unconstitutional, null and void. O. The Petitioner says and submits that the recording of "In-Camera" statements seems to be fabricated and got-up statements in order to put the detenu behind bars under Preventive Detention. The Petitioner says and submits that, even otherwise, the incidents mentioned therein are stale, remote and not proximate in time and, therefore, the order of detention smacks of malafides. 4 The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner relying upon Grounds A, B, C, F and O submits that there was non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority while passing the order of detention; there was delay in passing the order of detention; the alleged in-camera statements are fabricated and not properly verified by the Detaining Authority. She further submits that there was delay in submitting the proposal to Mantralaya by the Detaining Authority seeking approval of detention of Detenu. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner relied upon the following judgments :- 1] Anil vs State of Maharashtra and ors. 1 2] Rashid Shaukat Husain Sayyed @ Jagga vs The State of Maharashtra and ors. 2 and 3] Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar vs S Ramamurthi & ors. 3 1 2000(2) Mh.LJ 400 2 Order Bombay High Court dated 01/03/2018 in Cri.WP No.5284/2017. 3 AIR 1994 SC 656 5 On the other hand, learned APP appearing for the Respondents/State invites attention of this Court to the order of detention so also the grounds and the replies filed by the respective Respondents/Authorities and submits that the Detaining Authority after proper application of mind has passed the impugned order of detention. She further submits that there is no delay in passing the order of detention. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned APP pressed into service the exposition of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Deepak Govind Murudkar v/s. R. H. Mendonca & ors. decided on 10/03/2000 passed in Criminal Writ Petition No.2090 of 1999 (Coram : Vishnu Sahai and P V Kakade, JJ). It is submitted that the Detaining Authority relied upon two crimes i.e. C.R. No. 188/2019 and C.R. No. 208/2019, both registered with Samarth Police Station, Pune, and two in-camera statements while passing the order of detention. It is submitted that in the grounds of detention it is made clear that paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 are referred only for the purpose of showing that the Detenu is a habitual offender and the said grounds/material referred therein have not been considered by the Detaining Authority while arriving at subjective satisfaction before passing the order of detention. It is further submitted that the Detaining Authority has specifically stated in his reply that only paragraph Nos.6.1 and 6.2 of the grounds of detention are taken into consideration while passing the order of detention. It is also submitted that the statement of witnesses in-camera are recorded after adhering to the proper procedure and those are verified by the Detaining Authority. She submits that the noting in the original file would make it clear that the Detaining Authority has personally seen those statements. It is submitted that the 2nd in-camera statement was recorded on 10/08/2019 and the detention order has been passed on 16/10/2019, as the proposal was routed through the concerned government authorities, time was consumed in processing the proposal and therefore it cannot be said that there was delay in passing the order of detention against the Detenu. The learned APP invites attention of this Court to the specific averments made in the reply filed by Respondent-1 i.e. the Detaining Authority so also the reply filed by the Sponsoring Authority, and submits that the contentions raised in Ground Nos. A, B, C, F and O are specifically dealt with and replied and therefore there is no substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that there was nonapplication of mind by the Detaining Authority or there was delay in passing the order of detention or that in-camera statements are fabricated. It is submitted that the ground of delay in passing the order of detention has not been specifically raised by the Petitioner in the Petition and therefore the said ground orally agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner may be kept out of consideration. In support of the aforesaid contentions the learned APP relied upon following judgments :- 1] Hemlata K Shah vs State of Maharashtra and anr 4 and 2] Hetchin Haokip vs State of Manipur & ors. 5 4 (9181) 4 SCC 647 5 (2018) 9 SCC 562 6 We have given careful consideration to the rival submissions. With the able assistance of the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner and the learned APP appearing for the Respondents/State, we have carefully perused pleadings in the Petition and specifically the grounds A, B, C, F and O raised by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. 7 It is true that in the grounds of detention the Detaining Authority has stated that the offences registered against the Detenu mentioned in Paragraph Nos.5.1 and 5.2 are considered only for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that the Detenu even in past indulged in the similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Upon careful perusal of the reply filed by Respondent No.1 – Detaining Authority, in paragraph 8 thereof it is stated that Respondent No.1 – Detaining Authority has carefully gone through the material placed before him and he has subjectively satisfied that, the Detenu is a weapon-wielding dangerous desperado of violent character, indulging in terrorizing activities and since 2014 the Detenu is engaged in criminal activities, and the criminal activities of the Detenu have created a reign of terror in the minds of people. It is further stated that the Detenu and his accomplices move, armed with deadly weapons such as Koyata, knife, wooden stick and sword and do not hesitate to use the same while committing the offences such a robbery, hurt etc. Furthermore, in the said paragraph it is stated that the Detenu also does not hesitate to use these deadly weapons for threatening the peace loving public residing with the jurisdiction of Samarth, Wanawadi and Lashkar Police Stations, Pune City. 8 It is next stated that the Detenu has been habitually committing offences under Chapter XVI and XVII of Indian Penal Code as well as under Chapter V of the Arms Act and thus the Detenu is a dangerous person as defined in Section 2(b-1) of the said Act. The criminal activities of the Detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Detenu has thereby became dangerous to the lives and properties of people residing and carrying out their daily activities and vocations in the jurisdiction of Samarth, Wanawadi and Lashkar Police Stations in Pune City. There are 6 offences registered against the Detenu at Lashkar, Wanawadi and Samarth Police Stations in Pune City in addition to the two offences committed during past 6 months and that the dangerous criminal activities of the Detenu are found to be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. It is further stated that in order to curb the criminal activities of the Detenu, preventive actions under Section 56(1)(a)(b) of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 and under Section 3(2) of MPDA were taken against him but the same had no deterrent effect on the Detenu. It is further stated that the Senior Inspector of Police, Samarth Police Station i.e. the Sponsoring Authority conducted a confidential enquiry of the criminal activities of the Detenu and his associates, and during the confidential enquiry the Sponsoring Authority recorded in-camera statements of witnesses "A" and "B" on 02/08/2019 and 10/08/2019. It is also stated that the incidents recorded in the in-camera statements also show that criminal activities of the Detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Lastly in paragraph 8, the Respondent No.1 – Detaining Authority, has stated thus :- "after considering in-camera statements and two CRs i.e. Cr No.188/2019 and CR No.208/2019 and the documents placed before me by Sponsoring Authority, after perusing the said record, I was subjectively satisfied and after application of mind, I have passed the order of detention of the Detenu. As such the said order is legal, just and proper and as per the provisions of law and deserves to be confirmed." 9 In paragraph 9 of the reply Respondent No.1-Detaining Authority has stated thus :- "It is submitted that after my subjective satisfaction that the offences I considered for passing the Order of Detention are disturbing the public order and it is required to detain the detenu, I passed the order of detention under section 3(2) of MPDA Act 1981. It is further submitted that I being the Detaining Authority have passed the order of detention on the grounds mentioned in paragraphs 5.1, 5.2 and 6.1 and 6.2. As such in the said paragraph Nos.5.1, 5.2 particulars of offences mentioned, for passing order of detention." 10 The aforesaid averments would make it clear that while arriving at subjective satisfaction, the Detaining Authority has not only confined his application of mind to the two in-camera statements and two CRs i.e. C R No.188/2019 and C.R. No.208/2019, but also the documents placed before him by the Sponsoring Authority. It was incumbent upon the Detaining Authority to confine his application of mind to the two in-camera statements and two CRs i.e. C R No.188/2019 and C.R. No.208/2019 as has been stated in the grounds of detention while arriving at subjective satisfaction before passing the order of detention. However, it appears that the Detaining Authority has relied upon paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 in which particulars of past offences are mentioned, and the material referred in the said paragraphs have been considered by the Detaining Authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction. 11 The offences i.e. CR No.188/2019 under Sections 392, 506(2) of the IPC r/w Section 37(1)/135 of the Maharashtra Police Act r/w Sections 4/25 of the Arms Act r/w Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, and CR No.208/2019 under Section 394, 324, 506(2), 34 of the IPC have been registered with Samarth Police Station, Pune City, however, it is apparent from the averments made in the affidavit in reply of Respondent No.1 i.e. the Detaining Authority that the Detaining Authority has considered the other offences registered with other two police stations i.e. Wanawadi Police Station and Lashkar Police Station, Pune City while passing the order of detention. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Detaining Authority has not considered the other crimes registered with other two police stations while arriving at subjective satisfaction before passing the order of detention. 12 Though it is vehemently submitted by the learned APP appearing for the Respondents/State that there was no delay in passing the order of detention, nevertheless, from the reply filed by Respondent No.1 – Detaining Authority it is clear that the Sponsoring Authority sent proposal of the detention of Detenu on 14/08/2019 to ACP Faraskhana Division, Pune, who after verifying the truthfulness and genuineness of the statements of witnesses sent the said proposal to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone I, Pune City. The said Authority i.e. the Deputy Commissioner of Police forwarded the said proposal to the Additional Commissioner of Police, South Region, Pune on 03/10/2019. The Additional Commissioner of Police, West Region has scrutinized the proposal and forwarded it to the Police Inspector, Preventive of Crime Branch (PCB) Pune on 12/10/2019. The Police Inspector, Crime Branch (PCB) sent the said proposal to the DCP Crime Pune on 12/10/2019. The DCP Crime Pune forwarded it to the Additional Commissioner of Police Crime, Pune on 13/10/2019. Thereafter Additional Commissioner of Police Crime, Pune has scrutinized the proposal and submitted to the Joint Commissioner of Police, Pune on 14/10/2019. The Joint Commissioner of Police further scrutinized the said proposal and sent it to the office of the Commissioner of Police, Pune i.e. the Detaining Authority. Even if the time is reckoned from 14/08/2019 i.e. the date on which Sponsoring Authority sent the proposal to the ACP Faraskhana Division, Pune till 03/10/2019 i.e. the date on which Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-I Pune sent the said proposal to the Additional Commissioner, South Region, Pune, more than 45 days time was taken by the authorities in perusing and scrutinizing the said proposal. Not only that, the Additional Commissioner of Police West Region, Pune has forwarded it to Police Inspector, Preventive of Crime Branch (PCB), Pune on 12/10/2019. It is therefore clear that the Additional Commissioner of Police, West Region had also taken about 9 days time in forwarding the said proposal to the Police Inspector Preventive of Crime Branch (PCB), Pune. No plausible explanation has been offered by the Respondents Authorities as to why the proposal was kept pending by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone I, Pune City for a considerable period and then sent it to Additional Commissioner of Police, South Region, Pune on 03/10/2019 and as to why Additional Commissioner of Police, West Region, took 9 days time in scrutinizing and forwarding the proposal to Police Inspector, PCB Crime Branch, Pune. 13 In paragraph 9 of Pradeep Paturkar's case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus :- "The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinize whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case." 14 In the facts of the present case, as observed herein above, delay in forwarding the said proposal by the DCP, Zone I Pune to the Additional Commissioner of Police, South Region, Pune remains unexplained, so also the further delay in forwarding the said proposal by the Commissioner of Police, West Region, Pune to Police Inspector, Preventive of Crime Branch (PCB) also remains unexplained. So far as the said delay is concerned, there is no satisfactory or plausible explanation offered by Respondent No.1-Detaining Authority. Therefore, keeping in view the exposition of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar (Supra), and since no plausible explanation has been offered for delay in passing the order of detention, it will have to be held that there was delay in passing the order of detention. 15 It is contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that relying upon 6 offences, which were registered against the Detenu in the past, the order of an externment was passed against the Detenu externing him from certain areas, and therefore relying upon the said past offences while passing the order of detention would amount to violation of mandate of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, which reads as under :- "Art.20 (1)……. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3)…………." As already observed, the Detaining Authority in his reply stated that he has considered two in-camera statements and two CRs i.e. CR No.188/2019 and CR No.208/2019 and also the offences mentioned in paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of the grounds of order of detention, while arriving at subjective satisfaction before passing the order of detention. In that view of the matter, if the earlier offences are considered while passing the impugned order of detention, the Respondents Authorities were obliged to state proximity and live link between present proceedings for detention and those earlier offences registered against the detenu. 16 In the light of discussion in foregoing paragraphs an irresistible conclusion is that the order of detention impugned in this Writ Petition cannot be legally sustained, and therefore, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. Hence the following order is passed :- ORDER A] The impugned order of detention bearing No. PCB/DET/3405/2019 dated 16/10/2019 issued under Section 3(2) of M.P.D.A. Act, 1981 by Respondent No.1 is hereby quashed and set aside. B] The Detenu Firoj @ Babbali Maqbul Khan be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. C] The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed and Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. (V. G. BISHT, J.) (S. S. SHINDE, J.) Laxmikant Digitally signed by Laxmikant G. Chandan G. Chandan Date: 2020.02.21 11:43:27 +0530